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Organizations are exposed to threats that increase the risk factor of their ICT systems. The assurance of 
their protection is crucial, as their reliance on information technology is a continuing challenge for both 
security experts and chief executives. As risk assessment could be a necessary process in an organization, 
one of its deliverables could be utilized in addressing threats and thus facilitate the development of a security 
strategy. Given the large number of heterogeneous methods and risk assessment tools that exist, comparison 
criteria can provide better understanding of their options and characteristics and facilitate the selection of 
a method that best fits an organization’s needs. This paper aims to address the problem of selecting an 
appropriate risk assessment method to assess and manage information security risks, by proposing a set of 
comparison criteria, grouped into 4 categories. Based upon them, it provides a comparison of the 10 popular 
risk assessment methods that could be utilized by organizations to determine the method that is more 
suitable for their needs. Finally, a case study is presented to demonstrate the selection of a method based 
on the proposed criteria. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors: A.1 [Introductory and Survey] 
General Terms: Security, Risk Assessment 
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Risk assessment methods, comparison, criteria, overview 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been adopted widely by modern 
organization’s procedures and activities. Organizations’ reliance on ICT has become a 
continuous challenge for security experts and researchers, as its protection is an im-
portant issue, due to the numerous threats they are exposed to. When it comes to in-
formation security, the purpose of the organizations is to maintain the confidentiality, 
availability, integrity, non-repudiation, accountability, authenticity and reliability of 
the IT systems and their data (Schumacher et al. 2013). In addition, every organization 
faces threats that could hinder its activities, growth and profitability (Moeller 2004). 
These threats increase the risk factor of the ICT system and lead to the emergence of 
several security demands, which need to be met appropriately and systematically to 
assure the protection of the system.  
The means of developing a security strategy and roadmap is risk assessment (RA), 
which facilitates the estimation and calculation of the risk faced by the organization. 
Risk is mostly represented as a function of the degree of harm and the possibility of 
harm occurrence (NIST 2012). Risk management aims to identify, control and mitigate 
the risks to information systems (Stoneburner et al. 2002). Thus, risk assessment is a 
cornerstone of risk management, which includes steps that can be grouped into the 
following four phases, namely: (i) determination of risk faced, (ii) risk assessment, (iii) 
responsive actions to mitigate the risk and (iv) risk monitoring (Halliday et al., 1996; 
Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999;ASIS 2003; NIST 2012).   
 Currently, a plethora of heterogeneous RA methods is available, having a different 
focus (e.g. government agency, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)). Moreover, 
as a ‘silver bullet’ RA methodology does not exist, analysts have to choose from this 
number of different methods one that fits best the organization that will be assessed. 
However, apart from the heterogeneity of the methods, currently there is no consensus 
with regards to this selection process.  
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As such, the goal of this work is to limit the ambiguity of selecting the appropriate 
RA method by an organization. To this end, this work provides a meta-analysis of the 
RA methods that have been studied in the literature, enabling organizations to decide 
their appropriateness according to their demands. A set of comparison criteria has 
been extracted from the literature and grouped into four categories, namely validity, 
compliance, cost and usefulness. The use of the comparison criteria is demonstrated 
with a case study, in which an organization determines the method that is more suit-
able for its needs based on the technical, operational and procedural specifications of 
the methods.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work that 
compares risk assessment methods and proposes comparison criteria for the choice of 
a RA method. Section 3 describes our methodology and Section 4 briefly describes the 
RA methods that are included in our analysis. Section 5 provides a generic comparison 
of the RA methods followed by a case study demonstrating the selection of an RA met-
hod by an SME. Section 6 concludes our work and discusses future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
One of the most curial challenges faced by organizations is the estimation of the effecti-
veness and the cost of the actions deployed to ensure the security robustness of their 
activities (ENISA, 2012). To ensure the determination of the appropriate measures, 
with regard to cost effectiveness, to protect the Information System (IS) Risk Assess-
ment is performed. Consequently, RA is one of the processes that are considered as the 
most essential to take into account nowadays (Mellado et al. 2007) and provides a more 
thorough view of the operations of the information system. It is the most common secu-
rity management methodology and has become almost mandatory for all the big 
organizations. Calder et al. (2010) stress that RA is “the core competence of 
information security”.  
Nowadays many RA methods exist, each having its strengths and weaknesses. Each 
of them can thus be more or less suitable, according to the case or the specific needs of 
the organization. This section presents relevant literature and the comparison criteria 
that have been proposed for the comparison of RA methods. Even though there are 
many academic publications that present the most common RA methods, only a few of 
them provide their comparison as in our work. We also note that, contrary to our work, 
often academic publications propose comparison criteria without using them, or using 
them to compare only a few risk assessment methods (2-3 methods). Ionita (2013) and 
ENISA (2006), examined previous versions of some of the RA methods that are examin-
ed in this work. We extend and/or revisit their results by using a different grouping of 
some common criteria and by examining newer versions of the RA methods. 
Garrabrants et al. (1990) proposed the CERTS method to effectively and objectively 
evaluate tools for managing the risk that an information system is exposed to and to 
create comparison criteria for the tools. CERTS consists of seven criteria, namely: con-
sistency, usability, adaptability, feasibility, completeness, validity, credibility. Each 
criterion includes 2-4 attributes that describe and define the specific criterion (Garra-
brants et al. 1990). This work has been used by the academia and specialists, e.g. ENI-
SA (2006) used CERTS to create a sub-list of comparison criteria for RA methods. 
Lichtenstein (1996) proposed 17 criteria for the selection of an appropriate risk a-
nalysis method. This work mainly focuses on systems under development rather than 
existing ones and is based on CERTS (Garrabrants et al. 1990). It uses five out of seven 
CERTS criteria. The proposed criteria were grouped into (a) method characteristics 
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(including cost, agreement of analysts and management, flexibility, complexity, comp-
leteness, consistency, ease of use, usefulness, validity, reliability and software support) 
and (b) organization characteristics (including risk level, size, security awareness, ex-
ternal requirements and organizational structure) (Lichtenstein 1996). Lichtenstein’s 
(1996) and Garrabrants et al.’s (1990) work is the springboard for several proposed 
criteria frameworks (Smojver 2011; Nair 2013). 
In a different approach, Van Niekerk and Labuschagne (2006) compare the steps of 
RA methods. The structural dimensions of the framework include scope and 
assessment criteria that support its context depth and breadth. The procedural 
dimensions of the framework include: “process” and “assessment tools” that are used 
to enhance its functionality.  
ENISA has developed a “Log of risk assessment and risk management methods” 
(ENISA 2006) by using the various stages of evaluation and risk management, EU 
directives and ISO definitions, producing an updated inventory and comparison of Risk 
Assessment methods now available at the ENISA website (ENISA, 2006). The methods’ 
comparison used: (a) a list of products (methods and standards) that are related to risk 
analysis and (b) the definition of specific properties of 'products'. The ENISA criteria 
are summarized to general information that comprises the "identity" of the method or 
tool (e.g. life cycle, price, supported languages etc.), field area (licenses, certifications, 
appropriateness for organizations etc.) and user opinion (skills, support, method ma-
turity, etc.).  
NATO compared the steps of CRAMM, EBIOS, HTRA, NIST and MAGERIT to per-
form the analysis and evaluation of risk (NATO 2008).  
Syalim et al. (2009) presented a comparison framework focusing on MAGERIT, 
MEHARI, NIST and Microsoft's Security Guide. The framework is based on the steps 
of each method and its documentation (Syalim et al. 2009). Syalim’s work suggests 
that the methods include three general steps of risk analysis, namely “identification of 
threats”, “identification of vulnerabilities” and “risk determination”. All methods 
recommend countermeasures as part of the risk management process. 
Dong and Yadav (2014) created a framework for the comparison and analysis of 
methods of risk assessment. The framework relies on the phases of the analysis, such 
as ascertainment, measurement, evaluation and their results, and on key performance 
indicators related to the completeness and effectiveness of each method (Dong et al. 
2010). The objective of the framework was to provide an easy way for organizations to 
compare and select the appropriate method. However, as the author also admits, the 
framework has not been used in practice, yet. 
Sajko et al. (2010) used Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to develop a framework 
of criteria for the evaluation of risk analysis methods and tools (Saaty 1988). In parti-
cular, one of the proposed criteria is the support of the method or process. The support 
can either be methodical (metrics, objectivity, accuracy, flexibility, integrity) or soft-
ware (user interface, appropriate equipment etc.). Other criteria are the required re-
sources (information, people, money, time) and the motives and objectives of the met-
hod (Sajko et al. 2010). 
Derakhshandeh et al. (2011) proposed a framework for methods’ comparison based 
on six criteria ranging from 0-3, namely: required resources, data collection for assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities, cost, time, accuracy and simplicity (Derakhshandeh et al. 
2011). 
Smojver used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the criteria proposed by 
ENISA (2006) to propose a model that allows the transparent and objective comparison 
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of the different RA methods. The model aims to aid the selection of the method that is 
more appropriate for the needs of an organization (Smojver 2011). It includes five key 
criteria (namely method scope, the ease of use, the maturity of the method and the 
target audience) analysed in 17 further sub-criteria. The analysis of the 17 criteria is 
particularly extensive and helps to create an integrated assessment framework and to 
identify the characteristics of each method.  
Sunyaev (2011) proposed a comparison table for RA methods focusing on the health 
sector. The work used the ENISA criteria, which were enhanced with the level of detail 
and the ability to integrate in an organization. The table includes values in a scale 
from 0 to 5 to indicate the extent a criterion is met by each method (Sunyaev 2011). 
Macedo et al. (2012) proposed five comparison criteria for RA methods, namely: 
complexity, methodological approach, support tool, geographical coverage, and the 
origin. The aim was to provide assistance in the selection of methods through a foreclo-
sure process based on a series of simple criteria (Macedo et al. 2012). 
Padney et al. (2012) proposed 7 comparison criteria, namely: quantification, 
integration of security features, integration of threats and vulnerabilities, 
requirements phase perspective, accuracy level/validation, compliance with standards 
and the supporting tools (Pandey et al. 2012). As in Macedo's work (Macedo et al. 2012), 
a comparison table is used with binary (YES/NO) values for each criterion. 
Kiran et al. (2013) propose a framework comprising of a 10 comparison criteria for 
RA methods. Some of the criteria and the approach followed resemble the work of Ma-
cedo (2012), but more details and criteria were added.  
Ionita complements the criteria proposed by ENISA, NATO and Kiran et al. (2013) 
to compare RA methods using a table with binary (YES/NO) values (Ionita 2013). 
During the same period, Al-Ahmad et al. (2013) conduct a survey on the various risk 
management frameworks, creating a framework for the selection of the method that 
best fits an organization. The framework utilizes a set of seven comparison criteria for 
RA methods, i.e.: implementation costs,  necessary skills,  implementation of the met-
hod by other organizations,  availability of detailed guidelines and instructions from 
the provider,  implementation and application complexity,  flexibility, and adaptability 
(Al-Ahmad et al. 2013). The authors demonstrate their framework with a case study. 
Pan and Tomlinson (2016) provide a review of the RA literature from 2004-14. They 
classify academic papers according into seven categories related to risk assessment, 
namely those: a) that identify risk, b) compare risk analysis, c) improve risk analysis, 
d) compare frameworks, e) improve frameworks, f) provide case studies and g) perform 
risk evaluation by comparing the results of risk analysis. Finally, Shameli-Send et al. 
(2016) proposed a risk assessment taxonomy, which focuses only on risk analysis, using 
the following criteria: appraisement, perspective, resource valuation and risk measu-
rement.  
Wangen (2017) compares 11 Risk Assessment methods according to the identified 
tasks, application and results of the analysis using the CURF (Core Unified Risk Fra-
mework) (Wangen et al. 2016). His perspective is that previous frameworks for met-
hods’ comparison are restrictive as predetermined parameters limit the analysis when 
elements of the analysed methods do not fit into their definitions. Using his bottom up 
method that first identifies the tasks of the methods and them defines them, the Aut-
hor identifies numerous elements of risk identification, estimation and evaluation, 
ranking them according to completion scores (not addressed, partially addressed, fully 
addressed). After applying the method to case studies, the Author can illustrate advan-
tages and disadvantages of a set of three methods (OCTAVE A, ISO 27005 and NSM-
ROS) demonstrating their level of completeness (Wangen 2017).  
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In conclusion, one may notice the ambiguity among the criteria definitions, as they 
change over time and also the lack of consensus on the set of comparison criteria. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes our methodology with regards to (a) initial collection of the 
available RA methods and their filtering and (b) the comparison of the RA that are in 
scope of our analysis.  
 
3.1 Method selection criteria  
As discussed earlier, organizations have a lot of options when it comes to the selection 
of a RA method. This work considered the popularity of RA methods to compile a list 
that was subsequently filtered into a list of ten popular RA methods. To assess the 
popularity of the methods we considered: a) if the method is provided by an agency 
(e.g., NIST) or standardization body (e.g., ISO), b) if the method is recognized by the 
relevant scientific community (with academic citations) or industry, and c) ranking in 
the relevant search engines (Google Scholar, Google search). To narrow the number of 
RA methods the following selection criteria were used, which are commonly used in 
the literature (Houmb 2007; Kouns et al. 2010; Macedo 2012; NATO 2008; ENISA 
2006): 
 Is the proposed approach a method or a guideline? If it is a guideline then, does it 
contain a proposed method to use? If not, exclude. 
 Price and available documentation? Exclude if unavailable or hard to find in Eng-
lish. 
 Does the approach identify Information Security Risks? If not, exclude. 
 
3.2 Comparison criteria 
As discussed in Section 2, there is no consensus in the relevant academic literature, 
regarding the comparison and evaluation of RA methods in the form of a framework or 
set of criteria. In addition, the definition of criteria changes over time, therefore we 
created working definitions grounded on the reviewed literature. More specifically, this 
work uses a set of criteria have been compiled via: (a) surveying the relevant literature, 
(b) discussions with RA experts who work in the industry, and (c) the experience of a 
subset of the authors of this work, who have experience in delivering RA projects. Table 
I summarizes the comparison criteria that are used in this work.  
 
Validity. Refers to the extent in which the results of the analysis resembles reality (i.e., 
real circumstances and the real phenomenon) in multiple independent applications of 
the method in each configuration of the system (Garrabrants et al. 1990). Under this 
criterion, the following sub-criteria are grouped: a) proof of completeness, i.e. if the RA 
method includes all the phases of the risk assessment (Merkhofer 1985; Garrabrants 
et al. 1990; Lichtenstein 1996), which typically includes the following four phases: (i) 
preparation/scoping, (ii) risk identification, (iii) risk analysis, and (iv) risk evaluation, 
b) type of analysis (qualitative, quantitative) (Fischhoff et al. 1981; Vorster and Labus-
chagne 2005; Van Niekerk and Labuschagne 2006; Katzke 1988), and c) risk 
calculation class, which is based on the properties and factors of risk calculation 
(Zambon et al. 2011). In this criterion, likelihood is considered, according to ISO 31000, 
as the possibility of an event to happen, whether defined, measured or determined 
(probability/frequency). This is used for flexibility reasons since an event can occur 
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multiple times within a specified period of time. The operator "⊗" states a 
combination between two factors. This work uses the five classes of risk calculation as 
defined in (Zambon et al. 2011): 
 Class A. Methods in which risk calculation is based on the relationship between 
assets and threats, namely the combination of threat likelihood, the vulnerability 
of the asset to that specific threat and the impact on the asset:   
Risk (Threat, Asset) = Likelihood (Threat) ⊗ Vulnerability (Threat, Asset) ⊗ 
Impact (Threat, Asset) 
 Class B. Methods in which risk calculation is based on the outcome of the realiza-
tion of a threat and on the defined security requirements for a specific asset. This 
approach is helpful when risk assessment is performed for organizations that 
want to be certified and compliant to standards. 
Risk (Threat, Asset, Requirements) = Vulnerability (Threat, Asset) ⊗ Impact 
(Threat, Requirements) 
 Class C. Methods that present the financial loss that the incident would cause. 
“Risk (Threat, Asset) = Annual Loss Expectancy (Threat, Asset) = Likelihood 
(Threat, Asset) ⊗ Average Loss (Threat, Asset)” 
 Class D.  Methods in which risk calculation considers critical assets (e.g. assets of 
a critical infrastructure), based on the vulnerability level of the critical asset and 
the impact of the threat on this critical asset.  
“Risk (Threat, Critical Asset) = Vulnerability (Critical Asset) ⊗ Impact (Threat, 
Critical Asset)” 
 Class E. Contrary to Class A methods, Class E methods calculate risk based on 
security incidents (i.e. combining a threat with a vulnerability that is necessary 
for the occurrence of the threat), instead of threats thus are less generic. Risk is 
calculated with the combinations of the likelihood of the security incident and its 
impact to a critical asset.  
 “Risk (Incident, Asset) = Likelihood (Incident) ⊗ Consequences (Incident, Asset)” 
Finally, a qualitative risk assessment is based on evaluations made by an expert, so 
that risks can be classified in natural language according to nominal and ordinal scales 
(Refsdal et al. 2015). This approach does not use any numeric value and is usually 
based on opinion-based and subjective estimations. The output is summed up in 
classes, using scales such as “low”, “medium” and “high”. On the other hand, quan-
titative risk assessment uses ratio, difference absolute scales to represent money units, 
risk percentages or the quantification of the asset’s value that has been lost. In general, 
qualitative methods are faster to extract results and require less resources and data. 
Furthermore, proficiency in mathematics and economics is not required (Rosenquist 
2009). At the same time, the use of quantitative methods is suggested in cases of finer 
granularity or evaluations at technical level while a qualitative approach is 
recommended when information to be qualified is not homogeneous (Refsdal et al. 
2015). 
 
Compliance. This criterion refers to compliance with standards related to information 
security, regulations and other methods (ENISA 2006; Merkhofer 1985; Lichtenstein 
1996; Sajko et al. 2010). 
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Cost. The criterion refers to the risk assessment related expenditures (Olle et al. 1988). 
This includes the sub-criteria support cost and software cost (Browne 1989; Lichtens-
tein 1996; ENISA 2006). The former refers to the expenditure that is necessary to ac-
cess documentation and other sources related to the method (e.g. training, books, and 
user manual). The latter refers to the cost of the license of the software/tool.  
 
Usefulness. This criterion refers to the quality of having utility and especially practical 
worth or applicability of the method. It includes the following sub-criteria: (a) ease of 
use which consists of interface’s usability and documentation (Syalim et al. 2009), (b) 
life cycle namely the method’s release date and latest update (Olle et al. 1988; Craft et 
al. 1998; Syalim et al. 2009; ENISA 2006), (c) scope namely the method’s adaptability 
to meet an organization’s demands (Lichtenstein 1996; Kitchenham et al. 1997; Craft 
et al. 1998; Smojver 2011) and the focus of the risk assessment method (Olle et al. 1988; 
Garrabrants et al. 1990), (d) software support, namely if the method is accompanied 
by a tool that facilitates the RA process, (e) required training for implementation, 
usage and maintenance of the RA method (Kitchenham et al. 1997), and adaptability, 
i.e. the ability to adapt the method to the needs of a specific industry  (Garrabrants et 
al. 1990; Lichtenstein 1996; Sajko et al. 2010). 
 
In this work usability is defined by Lichtenstein (1996) and uses 3 criteria for its 
assessment, namely: 1) user friendly, 2) capable to handle errors, and 3) simple and 
comprehensive. If a method satisfies the above mentioned criteria, then the usability 
rate is evaluated as sufficient. If it satisfies two of them, then it is considered relatively 
sufficient and if it satisfies only one, then it is considered as insufficient. 
Finally, this work considers life cycle details as an indication of usefulness, as an 
outdated method does not include all the recent vulnerabilities, threats and safeguards 
and this hinders the process of the risk assessment. 
 
Table I. Evaluation and comparison criteria 
Validity Compliance  Cost  Usefulness 
Completeness  
Preparation (1) 
Risk Identification (2) 
Risk Analysis (3) 
Risk Evaluation (4) 
Compliance 
with Standards 
Support cost 
Software cost 
Ease of Use 
Usability 
(Interface, handle 
errors 
Documentation)  
Type of Analysis 
Qualitative 
Quantitative 
Scope 
Target Organization 
(Type, Size), Focus 
Risk calculation Class 
Class A 
Class B 
Class C 
Class D 
Class E 
Life Cycle 
Release  
Last Update 
Adaptability 
Software Support 
 Training 
4. RISK ASSESSMENT/RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS 
We now provide a brief description of the RA methods that are in scope of our analysis.  
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4.1 EBIOS 
As described by Agencenationale de la sécurité des systems d’ information the “EBIOS 
method was initially developed by the French Central Information Systems Security 
Division. The method is now maintained by private club experts from different fields 
(e.g. Club EBIOS)” (ANSSI 2010). EBIOS aims to support management in decision 
making by creating a common ground for security debates between different stakehol-
ders. To assess and manage the risks associated with Information Systems the method 
uses the five phases that are descripted in Table II. 
Unlike other methods that are scenarios-based, EBIOS uses a modular approach 
that allows a more in-depth analysis via the identification of the various individual 
components or risk causes, such as vulnerabilities, entities, and attack methods 
(Kouns et al. 2010). This modular design is one of the strongest aspects of EBIOS. 
 
Table II. EBIOS Phases (ANSSI 2010) 
 
 
4.2 MEHARI 
MEHARI was designed by security specialists of the French institute CLUSSIF (“Club 
de la Sécurité de l’ Information Français”). The method replaced MARION and MELI-
SA methods. It was announced in 1996 and provides a model for risk assessment, mo-
dular components and procedures to support it. MEHARI aims to help upper manage-
ment/executives implement the security standard ISO/IEC 27005. The method is com-
pliant with current security standards such as ISO 13335, 27001 and 27005. The pur-
pose was to enable a validated procedure for analyzing risk scenarios and provide tools 
for security management both long and short term (CLUSIF 2010). The method des-
cribes a complicated process that contains circular risk management steps and the 
formation of a knowledge base. Following the formation of the knowledge base, a sepa-
rate RA process is developed and implemented.  For each risk scenario the steps that 
are presented in Table III are followed: 
 
 
 
 
Table III. MEHARI Phases (CLUSIF 2010) 
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4.3 OCTAVE 
OCTAVE was created by the Software Engineering Institute of the Carnegie Mellon 
University (CERT 2008). The US Ministry of Defense initially funded the project to 
deal with the challenge of compliance with the HIPAA security standard. OCTAVE 
can be adapted to the needs of each organization and takes into account the resources, 
threats and vulnerabilities of organizational and technical nature. Several variations 
of the method and supporting tools exist, each serving a specific purpose (CERT 2008).  
The most recent supported method is OCTAVE Allegro and is based on the previous 
methods OCTAVE Original and OCTAVE-S (Caralli et al. 2007). The current frame-
work consists of three variants of the OCTAVE method and its main OCTAVE method 
for risk assessment is designed for organizations employing three hundred or more 
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employees and consists of the phases that are summarized in Table IV (Alberts et al. 
2003). 
OCTAVE is based on employee participation in the analysis team. Employees from 
different levels of the organization are involved to satisfy the organizational, operatio-
nal and technical requirements of the method. The focus of the method is on critical 
assets, for which the analysis is taking place.  
 
Table IV. OCTAVE Phases (Alberts et al. 2003) 
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4.4 IT-Grundschutz 
IT-Grundschutz was proposed in 1994 alongside a series of standards from the German 
Federal Security Service (BSI). It aims to achieve the appropriate organizational secu-
rity level, by offering general recommendations and actions to create an effective secu-
rity procedure along with detailed technical guidelines (German BSI 2014). IT-Grund-
schutz provides a qualitative method for identifying, analysing and assessing security 
incidents that can cause damage to the business. IT-Grundschutz consists of the steps 
that are summarized in Table V. 
The main body of IT-Grundschutz does not outline a specific method and provides 
“recommendations and suggestions for safeguards and security controls that are ap-
propriate for standard and typical business processes, applications and IT systems 
with common security requirements” (Nidd et al. 2015). Therefore, common assets are 
outlined along with aspects regarding the organization, the infrastructure and the per-
sonnel involved. The standard enumerates potential threats and suggests the approp-
riate safeguards. To identify the major inadequacies of the system and to comply with 
IT-Grundschutz standard, “relevant modules are chosen and implemented to each 
aspect of the information system. This approach enables a quick and financially 
sustainable way to a reasonable security level” (Kouns et al. 2010). Lastly, the method 
complies with the security standard ISO/IEC 27001. 
 
Table V. IT-Grundschutz Phases (German BSI 2014) 
 
 
4.5 MAGERIT 
MAGERIT is a method for risk analysis and risk management developed by the Spa-
nish Higher Council for Electronic Government (CSAE) (Amutio et al. 2014). MAGE-
RIT is a response to the increasing dependence of public services and private organi-
zations to information technology. The method is designed to serve anyone who works 
with digital information management systems.  
MAGERIT consists of the steps that are summarized in Table VI. To better orga-
nize the results, step 3 is perform upon the execution of all the other steps and the 
development of the scenario. As a result, a realistic estimation of the impacts, threats 
and risks is provided. MAGERIT is, also, supported by EAR/Pilar tool. 
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Table VI. MAGERIT Phases (Amutio et al. 2014) 
 
 
4.6 CRAMM 
CRAMM is a RA method that was created by the British Central Communication and 
Telecommunication Agency (CCTA) in 1985 (ENISA 2006). It was created with the aim 
to provide security evaluation of Information Systems in government departments. 
CRAMM provides a tool, which was later made commercially available to the public 
through Insight Consulting. The method and tool were developed mainly for applica-
tion in large-scale organizations, but can be also applied to SMEs (Yazar 2002; Spinel-
lis et al. 1999).CRAMM can also be used to (a) Justify investment decisions in the se-
curity of information systems and networks, based on measurable results and (b) de-
monstrate the compatibility of the organizations information systems with the British 
standard during an auditing process. CRAMM consists of three phases (Table VII). 
 
4.7 HTRA 
“The Harmonized Threat and Risk Assessment (HTRA) method was published under 
the auspices of the Chief of Communications Security Establishment and the 
Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)” (CSE 2007). The met-
hod aims at providing (Shallal 2013): 
(1) Flexibility - The method must be flexible so that it can manage all assets, either in 
physical or informational form, both within large organizations and small. 
(2) Scalability - To allow for the separation of larger and more complex HTRA's into 
smaller modules that are easier to handle, the method should support analysis, and 
provides the appropriate interfaces between the relevant data. 
(3) Simplicity - The method should be satisfactory and described in simple steps to al-
low easy implementation by management programs and projects, as well as security 
professionals. 
(4) Generality - The method must be adequately applied to all assets. 
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Table VII. CRAMM Phases (ENISA 2006) 
 
 
(5) Consistency - To achieve greater coherence between different HTRA used by diffe-
rent organizations, the method needs to establish common and simple vocabulary 
and terminology for all aspects of risk management. 
(6) Automation – It has been developed in order to allow automation to facilitate and 
support the HTRA process. 
The method consists of the six phases that are summarized in Table VIII: 
Table VIII. HTRA Phases (Shallal 2013) 
 
 
4.8 NIST SP800 
The NIST SP800 complements other standards of the SP800 framework, “provid-
ing a general method for overall risk management in Information Systems” (Kouns et 
al. 2010; Stoneburner et al. 2002; NIST 2012). The method consists of the three phases 
that are summarized in Table IX (NATO 2008). The method described in NIST SP800-
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30 is mainly qualitative. NIST 800-30 is primarily a model rather than a specialized 
method. Still, it contains a complete guide for defining all aspects of an effective risk 
management program. It also incorporates the guidelines and the processes required 
to assess and mitigate risks. It suits better large organizations such as government 
agencies and large enterprises. NIST SP800 supports the management of organizati-
ons, CIO's (Chief Information Officers), security officers, IT consultants and generally 
any person who has to do with risk management in an organization (Kouns et al. 2010). 
 
Table IX. NIST SP800 Phases (NIST 2012) 
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4.9 RiskSafe Assessment 
RiskSafe method was proposed and released in 2012 as a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) 
solution. It has been developed by consultants with extensive experience in conducting 
risk assessments on a wide range of business sectors, including Central Government, 
Local Government and Financial Services (Platinum Squared 2014). RiskSafe aims at 
making risk assessment a much more transparent process and help transform the as-
sessment and management of risks in a collaborative approach. This allows all inte-
rested parties to see how risks have been identified and then to record, maintain and 
comment on how these risks are treated (Platinum Squared 2014).  
Table X summarizes the phases of RiskSafe. 
Table X. RiskSafe Phases (Platinum Squared 2014) 
 
 
4.10 CORAS 
CORAS basically consists of three artefacts, namely a method for risk assessment, 
a language and a computerized tool. The CORAS language is a customized language 
for risk modeling. The language is diagrammatic. It uses simple graphical symbols and 
relations between these to facilitate diagrams that are easy to read and that are suit-
able as a medium for communication between stakeholders of diverse backgrounds. In 
particular, CORAS diagrams are meant to be used during brainstorming sessions 
where the discussion is documented along the way (Lund et al. 2011). 
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The first version of CORAS was developed within a European Union project (IST-
2000-25031) which was completed in 2003. Since then CORAS has undergone several 
major updates. The CORAS book (Lund et al. 2011) provides a comprehensive overview 
of the current version. The CORAS language was originally defined as a UML profile. 
The language has since then evolved into a domain specific language independent of 
UML through several iterations with feedback from industrial case studies, teaching 
and empirical investigations. The language has a formal semantics and is supported 
by a specialized calculus for risk reasoning. 
CORAS project aimed to develop a practical framework based on models and also 
being supported by a tool for effective risk assessment of critical systems (Aagedal et 
al. 2002). It uses a UML-based modeling language, which is used together with risk 
assessment for three purposes (Raptis et al. 2002): (a) an abstract description of the 
RA’s target, (b) facilitate communication between stakeholders, who can be manage-
ment, experts, departments, etc., (c) document the results and underlying assumptions. 
The CORAS language offers five kinds of basic diagrams: asset diagrams, threat diag-
rams, risk diagrams, treatment diagrams, and treatment overview diagrams (Lund et 
al. 2011). Table XI summarizes the phases of CORAS.  
  
Table XI. CORAS Phases (Lund et al. 2011) 
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5. COMPARISON OF RA METHODS  
This section utilizes the comparison criteria that were discussed in Section 3.2, to 
compare the RA methods that were selected for the analysis. The evaluation is based 
on the perceptions and experience of a subset of the authors - some of whom have ex-
perience in delivering RA projects - and the survey of the relevant literature (see sec-
tion 2). The results of the analysis are presented in the following subsections and are 
summarized in Tables XIII to XVI.  
 
5.1 Type of Analysis, Risk Assessment Phases and Class 
Table XII. Comparison of the RA methods based on the validity Criterion 
Category: Validity Completeness 
Risk 
Calculation 
Type of 
analysis 
Method/Criteria 
Risk assessment phase 
Class 
Qualitative 
or 
Quantitative 
1 2 3 4 
EBIOS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ B Qualitative 
MEHARI ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ A Qualitative 
OCTAVE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D Qualitative 
IT-Grundschutz X ✓ ✓ ✓ E Quantitative 
MAGERIT ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ A Both 
CRAMM ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ A Qualitative 
HTRA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ A Qualitative 
NIST SP800 X ✓ ✓ ✓ A Qualitative 
RiskSafe 
Assessment 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ A Qualitative 
CORAS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ E Both 
Note: The RA phases is using the following notation: 1 = preparation/scoping, 2 = risk identification, 
3 = risk analysis, and 4 = risk evaluation,   
  
Table XII summarizes the comparison of the RA methods under the validity crite-
rion.  
Regarding the risk calculation class sub criterion, our results suggest that the 
majority of the RA methods, which were studied in this work, fall under the Class A 
category, when risk calculation is considered. CORAS and IT-Grundschutz are classi-
fied as Class E, namely risks are assessed in relation to a security incident regarding 
an asset, and can be defined only in relation to a vulnerability. Even though these 
methods differ in the way risk is calculated, this does not necessarily mean they are 
inferior to others. It seems, however, that other methods have a slight advantage as 
they contain a broader concept of risk. Class A, methods consider that threats can 
affect an asset even without a vulnerability and this gives them the advantage over 
methods of Class E. 
Considering the completeness in RA phases, most perform similar risk analysis 
steps (Analysis, Management and Risk Mitigation). Some of the methods have refined 
these into smaller, separate analysis steps, covering most aspects, while others have 
grouped them in phases. More specifically, The HTRA divides the steps into 6 phases. 
The lack of technical depth and the fact that existing safeguards are not taken into 
consideration is considered as a disadvantage. The documentation of the method 
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describes mostly general guidelines without deepening in technical details. In each 
step predefined tables are provided. These tables are used to summarize the important 
data and evaluate it on the scale of values High, Medium and Low. The restrictive limit 
of characters allowed on each table is deemed as a disadvantage, since useful data can 
be lost. Also the division into 6 phases introduces a certain level of complexity into the 
method, even though each step is relatively easy to understand.   
CORAS supports all steps equally, which makes it a time-consuming process if the 
company is interested in a superficial evaluation of its security posture. It consists of 
8 steps, with the first 4 aiming to achieve an agreement with management (Lund et al. 
2011). Valuable time is spent in trying to achieve convergence with the administration 
that gives to this method the depth required for an analysis that involves from 150 to 
300 man hours. For each asset the degree of significance is defined in relation to its 
type (direct/indirect asset). Evaluation scales are defined by the user in these first four 
steps and can be eventually adjusted in later phases (Lund at al. 2011). For the iden-
tification and evaluation of risks a workshop is carried out in which threats, vulner-
abilities, and incident scenarios are identified. The method is based on the creation of 
threats diagrams, which depict how a combination of different vulnerabilities can lead 
to loss of one or more safety parameters. The data that is required to carry out the 
analysis is collected through meetings with a representative of the organization, du-
ring which a brainstorming session is held and is followed by a collection of any rele-
vant documentation and other materials (like statistics on risks for targets) (Lund et 
al. 2011). A meeting must be scheduled for each threat diagram and this characterises 
the usefulness of the method in respect of checklist approaches, which are not recom-
mended by practitioners nowadays considering the nature of crime-as-a-service and 
legal and regulatory requirements business have to comply with. Risk level is defined 
with a table that shows the correlation of the likelihood of an incident and the severity 
of the impact and the security parameters that are affected. 
CRAMM follows rigorous standardization in the preparation phase, which reduces 
its flexibility when compared to other methods. Strict standardization is utilized in all 
phases, which makes the method complex and time consuming. The data that are re-
quired by CRAMM, is mainly collected through interviews. CRAMM also separates 
assets into four categories: physical, applications/software, information/data and loca-
tions. Prior to asset valuation, CRAMM requires the construction of a model for each 
asset. A model is a relational schema, showing the relationships between the assets. 
The level of threat is identified in a scale of five qualitative values (from “very low” to 
“very high”) and the vulnerability is determined on the "Low," Medium "or High" scale. 
CRAMM takes into account any existing safeguards in the assessment of risk. The 
calculation of an asset’s implied value is also deemed as advantage, as it is something 
that seems to be missing from some of the other methods. CRAMM calculates the risk 
of each asset group using predefined tables and comparing the value of assets, the 
impact and levels of threats and vulnerabilities. 
EBIOS is divided into five phases. The documentation though is available only in 
French, which is deemed as disadvantage as it prevents non-native speakers to under-
stand the method. The method considers the existing safeguards, which is considered 
as an advantage. The method defines threat as the combination of a threat agent, an 
exploitation method and a set of vulnerabilities and entities that suffer from them. For 
each threat, the method uses an opportunity value, calculated from the number of vul-
nerabilities associated with it. The EBIOS method does not make use of scenarios, but 
follows a structured approach to identify and evaluate risk components. This gives it 
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the advantage of a relatively flexible and exhaustive risk analysis, compared with ot-
her methods such as MEHARI, which are less flexible and use scenarios. 
IT-Grundschutz contains detailed technical guidelines and general recommenda-
tions. Its steps are similar to those of CRAMM and MAGERIT. However, IT-Grund-
schutz does not focus on defining the project's context. It divides risk analysis into two 
levels, which allows faster execution of the whole process. Due to the time saving 
achieved, this characteristic is considered an advantage. 
MAGERIT has the advantage that it can use either qualitative or quantitative cal-
culations of risk. The method conducts risk calculation via predefined tables or algori-
thmic analysis. It separates the steps into more sub phases, which enhances the met-
hod with more flexibility compared to methods that strictly follow the standardization 
of four phases, such as CRAMM and IT-Grundschutz. MAGERIT does not make use of 
the concept of vulnerability, which can be regarded as disadvantage when compared 
to other methods. MAGERIT separates assets into nine categories and uses a scale 
with values from "Minimum" to "Very High" for the likelihood of realization of a threat. 
Threats valuation follows a different approach from most methods. To assess threats, 
MAGERIT defines a 5 metric table (potential, likelihood, easy, frequency), each with 
its own value range. This is considered as an advantage as it gives more granularity 
to the threat valuation. Also, the method calculates different types of risks, such as 
accumulated and deflected risk. This gives an advantage over methods such as 
CRAMM, IT-Grundschutz, and MEHARI, which calculate only one type of risk. 
MEHARI is divided into 8 steps, which adds complexity to the execution of the 
method. Its dependence on a knowledge base is not something that can be deemed as 
advantage or disadvantage, due to the fact that its creation can be either helpful or 
time consuming. This holds true as the steps of the method are closely dependent upon 
the use of the knowledge base, but on the other hand, the use of such database may 
help to accelerate the whole RA process. MEHARI uses scenarios to identify and assess 
risk, which are stored and modeled within its knowledge base. The analysts must 
choose the scenario that best fits in each situation. The scenarios are chosen based on 
the impact level, the type of the asset and the type and nature of the stake-holders. To 
calculate the severity of a given scenario, the residual impact and likely-hood are taken 
into account. These are calculated from the difference of the intrinsic impact and like-
lihood of an incident with the existing safeguards. The method utilizes questionnaires 
to calculate risk. Additionally, tables with untimely values for assessing risk and re-
ducing agents are used. One could claim that the overall process of creating the know-
ledge base can be complicated and time consuming.  
NIST SP800 is primarily a general standard and not a specific method. This can 
be considered as disadvantage as each organization may implement its guidelines in a 
different way. Nevertheless, NIST SP800 describes the risk management process bas-
ed on three phases, which incorporate all the steps of the risk management process. 
The method focuses mainly on risk assessment and uses a scale with values "Low", 
"Medium" and "High" to evaluate risk. The fact that NIST SP800 considers the existing 
countermeasures is deemed as an advantage. However, the first phase involves nine 
steps, therefore increasing the complexity and the time that is needed. 
OCTAVE uses all 4 RA phases. Each phase consists of workshops, in which all the 
necessary data is gathered, through the use of questionnaires. A relatively large num-
ber of employees is involved in each phase, which may increase the overall completion 
time. Another disadvantage is the fact that the existing safeguards are not taken into 
consideration. Contrary to other methods such as CRAMM, MAGERIT, MEHARI and 
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EBIOS, OCTAVE does not analyse and does not make recommendations of safeguards 
to mitigate risk. OCTAVE forms a threat profile for each asset, which matches the 
asset with security requirements, possible threats, vulnerabilities and impacts. These 
profiles are then extended into risk profiles with the addition of the impact of each 
threat. For the impact classification, a scale with Low, Medium, High values is used. 
Technical vulnerabilities are divided into 9 classes (servers-hosts, wireless components, 
networking components, desktop workstations, storage devices, security components, 
other devices). The fact that the method is dependent on external tools to identify vul-
nerabilities of the system components for which no documentation is included, is con-
sidered as a limitation of the method. 
RiskSafe turns risk assessment into a collaborative process, which is considered as 
an advantage over other methods. As a process, RiskSafe includes three phases which 
is deemed as an advantage due to its simplicity. One of the method’s advantages is the 
fact that the existing security countermeasures are included in the RA process. Howe-
ver, its collaborative approach requires good team management skills, which might 
increase the time needed for the completion of a project, if a good level of cooperation 
and coordination among the analysis team does not exist. 
 
5.2 Compliance with Standards, Costs 
With regards to the compliance criterion, this subsection summarises the methods’ 
compliance with standards from ENISA (2006), omitting those that have been with-
drawn and replaced by subsequent standards (e.g. BS7799 replaced by ISO/IEC 27001). 
More specifically, our analysis suggest that MAGERIT is the method that is compliant 
with the most standards (4 international ISO/IEC standards in total). MAGERIT is 
followed by CRAMM, RiskSafe as well as IT-Grundschutz (see Table XIII). CORAS is 
compliant with ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO31000 (Beckers et al. 2014). For OCTAVE and 
HTRA no sufficient information was found regarding their compliance with standards, 
either in their documentation or the relevant literature. As summarized in Table XIII, 
most analysed methods comply with the international standard ISO/IEC 27001. 
Considering the expenditures, at the time of writing this paper, most methods are 
available for free with the exception of CRAMM and RiskSafe. CORAS is available free 
of charge and a book, which explains in detail the method, exists that costs €96. 
CRAMM requires an annual usage license with varying cost (from €312 for the basic 
version up to €1.000 for the full edition). The CRAMM Express software also requires 
an annual license that begins from €1.800 and can reach €3.500 for the full version. 
RiskSafe also provides software and access to documentation on a monthly charge.  
MAGERIT’s advantage against CRAMM and RiskSafe is the free access to its docu-
mentation, along with the 30 days free use of all supporting tools. Pilar, the commercial 
tool that supports MAGERIT, is provided in 3 different versions, each one with im-
proved functionality. Its basic version costs €250 and each additional profile costs extra 
€150. The full version of Pilar costs €1500. Purchase of the supporting database and 
technical support is optional. Finally, the basic cost of €500 includes only qualitative 
analysis. EBIOS, MEHARI and CORAS are provided for free along with their corres-
ponding supporting tool. MEHARI is supported by the RISICARE tool, which is distri-
buted by BUG SA. For the rest of the methods, a variety of supporting tools exist, with 
a price range between 250-700 euros, while the HTRA and NIST SP800 are not sup-
ported by such software. 
The above mentioned are summarized in Table XIII. 
 
Table XIII. Acceptance and Cost Criteria 
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 Acceptance Cost 
Method/ 
Criteria 
Compliance with standards Support cost Software cost 
EBIOS 
ISO/IEC 27001, 15408-
1:2009,   21827:2008 
Free Free 
MEHARI 
ISO/IEC ISO/IEC 
27005:2011, 27001 
Free + Open 
source 
Free 
OCTAVE N/A Free €1300 
IT-Grundschutz ISO/IEC 27001 Free €860 
MAGERIT 
ISO/IEC, 27002, 
15408-1:2009, 27001 
Free + Trial 
Version 
€1500 
CRAMM ISO/IEC 27001 €1800-€3500  €1900-€3730  
 HTRA N/A Free N/A 
NIST SP800-30 ISO/IEC 27001 Free N/A 
RiskSafe  
ISO/IEC 27001, HMG 
Security Policy Framework,  
The Baseline Control Set 
defined by HMG, PCI DSS, 
PSN Code of Connection, 
SANS Institute Top 20, 
Cloud Security Alliance’s 
Cloud Controls Matrix 
Pay per User After contact 
CORAS ISO/IEC 27001, ISO31000 €95  Free 
 
5.3 Ease of Use, Life Cycle, Scope, Focus 
The HTRA method is described with simple steps. However, its user guide is com-
plicated and hard to comprehend by non-experts. In addition, the lack of technical 
depth and guidelines adds more difficulty in understanding the use of the method. As 
a result, the usability level is considered as unsatisfactory. CORAS is simple to use. 
Through the continuous board of directors’ meetings the method attempts to reduce 
and handle any possible errors. However, it adds complexity since it demands from 
analysts to use skills that have no relation to the information systems, such as com-
munication skills. In general, this method is considered simple to understand and use. 
The disadvantage, though, is the need of continuous communication and cooperation 
between related parties, as it increases the time complexity of the process. Therefore, 
the usability level is considered relevantly satisfactory. 
CRAMM suffers from the strict standardization of each step. The method can be 
used by non-qualified people, only after being trained. Additionally, the method is li-
mited by its strict standardization. The method facilitates error detection, since at the 
end of each phase analysts can review the results. Therefore, the usability level is 
considered as relevantly satisfactory.  
EBIOS is relatively simple and easy to understand. The fact that the available 
documentation is provided only in the French language is deemed as a disadvantage, 
as it makes the method difficult to learn and use, hence the usability level is considered 
as unsatisfactory. 
IT-Grundschutz requires both technical and theoretical background. This is due to the 
fact that it was part of a standard, addressed to people with specialized knowledge in 
the field of security. It divides risk analysis and risk assessment in two levels, which 
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makes it easier to use and can be adjusted to systems with different complexity levels. 
Also, it is supported by thorough guidelines and documentation and this levels the 
required specialized background. Usability level is considered relatively satisfactory. 
 
Table XIV. Usefulness Criteria: Ease of Use, Life Cycle and Scope 
Category: 
Usefulness 
Ease of Use Life Cycle Scope 
Method/Criteria 
Overall 
Usability Level 
Release 
Last 
update 
Target 
Organization 
Focus 
EBIOS Unsatisfactory 1995 
2004 
(v2.0) 
Small &Big RA 
MEHARI Unsatisfactory 1998 
2010 
(MEHARI 
2010) 
Small &Big RM 
OCTAVE 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
1999 
2005 
(v2.0) 
Small &Big RA/RM 
IT-
Grundschutz 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
1997 
2005 
(v2.0) 
Small &Big RM 
MAGERIT 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
1997 
2013 
(v3.0) 
Small &Big RA 
CRAMM 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
1985 
2011 
(v5.1) 
Small & Big 
(mostly big & 
governmental) 
RA 
 HTRA Unsatisfactory 2007 
2007 
(TRA-1) 
Small &Big RM 
NIST SP800 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
2002 
2002 
(rev. 2012) 
Small &Big RM 
RiskSafe 
Assessment 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
2012 
2012 
(v1.0) 
Small &Big RA 
CORAS 
Quite 
Satisfactory 
2003 2010 Small &Big RA 
 
 MAGERIT provides technical documents that facilitate the method’s understand-
ing, both to experts and those who only have basic security background. The steps are 
considered to be simple and easily understood and supported by detailed documenta-
tion. However, certain sections of the documentation have not been translated from 
Spanish, referencing Spanish version of the documentation is a considerable limitation. 
Thus, its usability is considered as relatively satisfactory. 
MEHARI is highly dependent in the creation of the knowledge base, which quite 
complicated and time consuming. The use of the knowledge base increases the difficul-
ty of the method’s use and introduces difficulties in understanding the whole process. 
Also, MEHARI can only be used with specialized calculation sheets or applications, 
which is a limitation. Hence, its usability level is considered as non-satisfactory.  
NIST SP800 is a standard, within which a simple and flexible procedure of risk 
assessment is provided. It provides thorough documentation, which assists the under-
standing of the risk assessment. During the first assessment phase, the steps 2,3,4,6 
can take place simultaneously, providing the option of data validation and ease error 
handling. Therefore, the usability level is considered relatively satisfactory. 
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OCTAVE is based upon the knowledge and the participation of the organization’s 
employees. It provides sufficient documentation that facilitates the method’s under-
standing. OCTAVE is considered simple that can be implemented even by non-security 
experts. Therefore, the usability level is considered as relevantly satisfactory.  
RiskSafe is similar to CRAMM. Its documentation is not easily found, which is 
characterized as a limitation. However, the method is relatively simple and can be 
comprehended even by non-security savvy users. It can easily comply with and support 
security standards and governmental directives. In addition, the facilitation of colla-
boration between analysts provides an ad hoc confrontation of any errors and data 
supply feedback. Thus, the usability level is regarded as relevantly satisfactory. 
HTRA was released in 2007 however no further updates were found ever since and 
the method is not providing any software/tool. On the contrary, CORAS was created in 
2003 but in 2011 it was updated, adding up to date safeguards, threats and vulnerabi-
lities. CRAMM is considered outdated as it was last updated in 2011. It is considered, 
though, more up to date than HTRA. EBIOS was created in 1995 and the last update 
was in 2010, thus it is considered outdated.  
IT-Grundschutz was created in 1997 and last updated in 2005. It is considered 
obsolete especially compared to CRAMM and EBIOS, which were last updated in 2011 
along with their relevant tools. There is a plethora of tools supporting IT-Grundschutz, 
but most have not been updated since 2004. MAGERIT was created in 1997 and was 
recently updated (2013), therefore it is the most updated method. At the same time, its 
supporting tools are often being updated to comply with modern security requirements 
and demands.  
Similarly to EBIOS, MEHARI was created in 1998 and was last updated in 2010. 
NIST SP800-30 is considered outdated as it was last updated in 2012 (it was released 
in 2001). However, it is the second most updated method after MAGERIT. OCTAVE 
was created in 1999 and last updated in 2005. RiskSafe method was created in 2012 
and since then, has not been updated. 
In summary, MAGERIT, NIST SP800, CRAMM and RiskSafe are the methods that 
have been more recently updated. Among them, CRAMM though is considered as the 
most obsolete, as the method and its supporting tools do not seem to receive the same 
amount of updates or attention from the organization that maintains it, compared to 
the other three abovementioned methods. MAGERIT is considered as the most updat-
ed method. Furthermore, EBIOS and MEHARI, even though they have not been up-
dated since 2010, are still actively supported by large organizations such as CLUSIF 
and ANSSI. 
 
5.4 Software Support, Training, Adaptability 
Most of the RA methods that have been examined provide software/tools that facilitate 
their use. The HTRA and NIST SP800 are the only methods that did not provide such 
a tool. MEHARI only provides a purposely-built, Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet, 
which is both restrictive and disadvantageous. This holds true, as the spreadsheet 
provide limited functionality compared to software/tool. As discussed earlier, various 
tools exists that support IT-Grundschutz. However, this does not imply that the met-
hod has an advantage over other methods, such as CRAMM, MAGERIT, MEHARI and 
RiskSafe. Regardless of the number of supporting tools, a method may have sufficient 
level of support with fewer or only one dedicated and updated tool. 
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These methods that have been examined require different experience and skills 
from their users. More specifically, MAGERIT, CORAS, MEHARI and OCTAVE requ-
ire their users to have experience in risk assessment and have at least practical expe-
rience in the field of security. CRAMM and RiskSafe require more specialized know-
ledge and experience. EBIOS and NIST SP800-30 are tailored to administrators, but 
they can also be used by most users since they contain enough detail for the risk ana-
lysis and RA process. However, they do not include technical or organizational and 
human aspects of security of information systems. All the above mentioned methods 
require users to have expertise in risk assessment.  
The HTRA method focuses on people who will perform the analysis and assessment 
process. It contains enough implementation details, but provides only limited technical 
depth when compared to other methods. The method only requires basic IT skills for 
its use. In contrast, IT-Grundschutz requires expert skill level for its use, specifically 
experience and expertise in security and is suitable primarily for use by individuals 
with specialized backgrounds, both technical and theoretical. 
Regarding the flexibility and adaptability of the methods, HTRA has been designed 
in order to be flexible. Each phase contains clearly defined steps, which are supported 
by the use of tables. It can be adjusted to the needs of different organizations and their 
systems, regardless of their size and complexity. On the other hand, the procedure of 
completing all the assessment tables is a double-edged sword, as experienced analysts 
regard this as a time consuming and cumbersome process. Although not supported by 
a tool, the method provides automation. Therefore, the method is considered as 
relatively flexible. 
CORAS uses its own modelling language and supporting diagrams. This helps the 
iterative collaboration and communication, however, the small set of symbols may be 
quite restrictive on its flexibility. The fact that it is supported by an open source tool 
is considered as an advantage as each organization can adjust it to its needs. The de-
pendence on its diagrams though, decreases the method’s flexibility. This holds true as 
an analyst has to use a restrictive set of diagrams and must have expertise in the use 
of UML. Thus, the method is considered as non-flexible. 
CRAMM is considered non-flexible due to its strict standardization in each step, 
which restricts analysts. In addition, the dependence to a single tool, the CRAMM tool, 
which is not free decreases the flexibility of the method.   
The modular design of EBIOS, enable the method to be easily adapted to conform 
to national security standards. The method can be used in both the design of a system 
and on existing information systems. Also, it is supported by a free tool, which is 
relatively simple to use. Therefore, the method is relatively flexible and an analyst can 
easily adapt it to the needs of each use case.  
The two-tier approach of IT-Grundschutz allows scaling the method in different 
size and complexity systems. Disadvantageous is judged the fact that specialized back-
ground is required for the use of the method. Therefore, the methodology is considered 
as relatively flexible. 
MAGERIT covers all aspects of a complete risk analysis process. The method pre-
sents a flexible RA procedure that can be applied both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
The method also provides the calculation of three types of risks while others such as 
CRAMM, the EBIOS or MEHARI calculate only one. Also, threats can be estimated 
either by the use of tables or algorithmic. Disadvantageous is considered the fact that 
the method can be applied only by using the EAR/Pilar tool but nevertheless it is 
considered as relatively flexible. 
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Table XV. Usefulness criteria: Software Support, Training, Adaptability 
Category: 
Usefulness 
Software Support Training Adaptability 
Method/Criteria Software 
Users* 
Flexibility 
M O T 
EBIOS EBIOS tool ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
MEHARI 
MEHARI 2010 basic Tool 
(Free), RISCCARE 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
OCTAVE Resolver Ballot ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
IT-Grundschutz 
BSI - GSTOOl, HiScout 
SME, SAVe, IGSDoku, 
Secu-Max, Baseline-Tool,  
PCCheckheft 
X X ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
MAGERIT μPilar, Pilar Basic, Pilar ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
CRAMM 
CRAMM expert, CRAMM 
express 
✓ ✓ ✓ No Flexibility 
 HTRA N/A X X ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
NIST SP800 N/A X ✓ ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
RiskSafe 
Assessment 
SaaSRiskSafe Tool ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Relatively 
Flexible 
CORAS CORAS Tool ✓ ✓ ✓ No Flexibility 
Note: M refers to Management, O to Operational, T to Technical. Management means that guidelines are 
given at a very generic level, Operational that guidelines contain details about the implementation suitable 
for most users and Technical means that guidelines contain mostly technical details. 
 
MEHARI describes a complex process that it is highly dependent on the creation 
of a knowledge base. It is designed to utilize the knowledge base, which means that it 
can only be used in conjunction with a special tool or a dedicated spreadsheet designed 
for this reason. The method devotes enough time in the creation of a knowledge base. 
The over-reliance on it is considered as disadvantage. The method provides relatively 
flexible steps for the RA phase, since it allows the analyst make the necessary changes 
so that they suit the needs of the organization. Despite the dependence on the creation 
and use of knowledge base the RA process is considered as being relatively flexible. 
NIST SP800 provides a generic risk management method, which is based on the 
expertise and knowledge the analysts possess and their cooperation with the manage-
ment and system operators. Therefore, it allows a relatively large flexibility to the a-
nalyst. Also, it provides generic guidelines that can be adapted to the needs of an or-
ganization. For these reasons, the method described in NIST SP800 is considered as 
relatively flexible. 
OCTAVE can be adapted to the needs of each organization, while providing diffe-
rent versions that take into consideration the organization’s size and the complexity. 
The method’s steps are considered relatively flexible, allowing the adaptation to the 
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project, based solely on the available resources of the organization. OCTAVE also al-
lows the participation of external experts while relying on the skills of employees in 
the organization. Unlike other methods, such as CRAMM, MAGERIT or MEHARI, it 
does not include the step of risk mitigation and the recommendation of safeguards. 
Overall it is a relatively flexible method, able to adapt to any specific situation. 
The RiskSafe resembles CRAMM. However, the method supports collaborative 
processing of risk analysis via the Cloud and can easily support different standards 
beyond ISO/IEC 27001. The company that maintains the method provides guidance 
for compliance with other security standards and how can risk analysis easily be car-
ried out with 10 steps. The tool that supports the method allows adding options and 
editing existing parameters, such as adding or editing threats. The method is relatively 
flexible. 
Overall, as the results suggest most of the methods that have been analysed pro-
vide a sufficient level of flexibility. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that MAGERIT and 
RiskSafe suggest a fairly flexible valuation of risk, while providing the right tools to 
support it. RiskSafe is unique as it provides cooperative risk assessment via the Cloud. 
MAGERIT is the only method that supports both qualitative and quantitative risk 
analysis and is also supported by a fairly versatile tool. 
 
5.5 Case study 
This subsection demonstrates the selection of a RA method based on the proposed 
comparison criteria. The case study refers to the SME sector in the UK, where based 
on literature (Henson and Garfield 2016) we need to turn estimations of the sector 
regarding the criteria, into ranking among them. 
To this end, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Smojver 2011) is utilised, an 
approach that can be used to address problems involving selections based on multiple 
criteria. It is assumed that an SME uses AHP to select the appropriate method for Risk 
Assessment, considering the proposed criteria: validity, compliance, cost and useful-
ness. For readability reasons, we assume that the SME is considering only CRAMM, 
CORAS, MEHARI and OCTAVE as alternatives available for the method selection. 
 Initially AHP is applied to rank the four aforementioned criteria. Then, the same 
process is applied to rank the methods for each criterion. In order to rank the criteria, 
AHP requires that the relative importance among the criteria is defined. Based on 
Henson’s and Garfield’s (2016) work, we define the following relative importance a-
mong the criteria: (a) “Cost” is two times more important than “Validity”, as SMEs 
attempt to limit expenses, (b) “Validity” is two times more important than “Usefulness”, 
(c) “Cost” is four times more important than “Compliance”, as they consider that stan-
dards are important only for large businesses, (d) “Usefulness” is two times more im-
portant than “Compliance”, (e) “Validity” is three times more important than “Comp-
liance”, and (f) “Cost” is three times more important than “Usefulness”. The following 
matrix (Fig. 1) is formed based on the aforementioned. 
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Figure 1: Relative importance matrix 
 
By multiplying the matrix with itself we get the eigenvector that contains the 
ranking of the criteria.  
 
Then, we add each row’s sum and normalize the values by diving each sum with 
the total one. 
 
The result ranks the criteria with the following order: (a) Cost, (b) Validity, (c) Use-
fulness, and (d) Compliance. 
Following, we apply the same procedure for each criterion for the available alter-
natives (i.e. the RA methods) in order to rank them appropriately. We demonstrate the 
process for Usefulness criterion. We, again, define the following relative importance 
among the alternatives: (a) OCTAVE is two times more useful than CORAS, (b) OC-
TAVE is two times more useful than CRAMM, (c) CRAMM is two times more useful 
than MEHARI, (d) CORAS and CRAMM are considered to have the same usefulness 
level between them, (e) CORAS is two times more useful than MEHARI, and (f) OC-
TAVE is two times more important than MEHARI. The following matrix (Fig. 2) is 
formed based on the aforementioned. 
By multiplying the matrix occurred with itself we get the eigenvector that contains 
the ranking of the alternative methods. For Usefulness, the alternatives are ranked 
with the following order: (a) OCTAVE, (b) CORAS, (c) CRAMM, and (d) MEHARI. 
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Figure 2: Usefulness relative importance matrix 
 
Applying the same approach for each criterion, we get the final outcome of the ran-
king process which is presented in Figure 3. This allows an SME to choose the desired 
RA method based on the criteria that the company considers as most important. In 
this case study, MEHARI would be a desirable selection, with CORAS being second in 
ranking, based on the requirements set by such a company, as they rank highly in the 
“Cost” criterion. 
 
Figure 3: Criteria Ranking 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This work examined and presented a set of criteria for the comparison of RA/RM met-
hods, which was identified as a need by the state of the art review. The criteria allow 
analysts and organizations to determine which method is best for their needs. The 
proposed criteria are grouped into four categories: validity, acceptance, cost and useful-
ness. Each category includes more sub-criteria that are used to compare ten widely 
used RA methods. The selection of the methods was made in relation to specific factors, 
such as their popularity, e.g., their use from organizations and governments, agencies, 
such as NIST, or standardization bodies, such as ISO and recognition by the relevant 
scientific community.  
Implicit guidelines on how organizations should select the most appropriate RA 
method based on comparison criteria is missing from the literature. Consequently, this 
work demonstrates a ranking method using the proposed comparison criteria. The 
ranking adjusts in accordance to each organization’s needs. This holds true as organi-
zations’ security needs vary according to factors, such as their type, size or the environ-
ment they operate in, which affects the importance of each criterion. The comparison 
results of the RA methods, which are summarised in Tables XIII to XVI, can be used 
by an organization as input in a ranking method (e.g. AHP) in order to select the most 
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appropriate method tailored to its needs. In our work, this ranking is demonstrated in 
a case study for SMEs in the UK using the Analytical Hierarchical Process. 
For future work, we plan to evaluate the criteria that have been presented in this 
work in conjunction with AHP using organizations of the public and private sector in 
order to examine the importance of each criterion with regards to its type and also 
verify that the indicated method would suit their needs. 
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